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INTRODUCTION

Consider two scenarios. In the first, consider a child named Jack.
Jack is sixteen years-old. He comes from a single-parent home, has an
occasional drug habit, rarely attends school, and has been diagnosed
with a medical condition requiring the use of Ritalin, which he discontinued using eight years ago. Jack, who has never been in any trouble
with the law, commits a burglary and is subsequently caught. After
his confession, followed by a rocky two-week period of trial probation, Jack comes before the judge for disposition. His fate hangs in
the balance.
In the second scenario, consider Jill.' She has the same background
and characteristics of Jack: single-parent home, drug habit, medical
condition, and spotty school attendance. She too commits a burglary,
her first offense, and comes before the judge.
Jack's judge looks at the record, hears from the parties involved,
and consults the Texas Family Code (the Code) to consider the Progressive Sanctions Guidelines (PSGs) laid out therein.2 He follows
the guidelines, determines that burglary is a second degree felony, or a
sanction level four offense, and determines that the suggested range of
disposition is six to twelve months in an intensive services probation
(ISP) program, followed by six to twelve months of supervised probation.3 Additionally, the judge determines that the Code suggests that
he require Jack or Jack's parent to participate in services and programs that address Jack's problems.4 The judge decides that even
though Jack is a first-time offender, he needs the help of the system to
get on track and orders Jack to the maximum under the guidelines:
twelve months ISP, twelve months supervised probation, and attendance in a drug treatment program, in addition to psychological and
family counseling for Jack and his mother. Jack leaves court with his
mother after having been given the appropriate phone numbers for
his new probation officers and literature concerning the treatment
programs he has been ordered to attend. He's back in school the next
morning.
Jill's judge has had a bad day. He too has the Code on the bench
but rarely looks at the sentencing guidelines because his wealth of experience pervades the need for such "fill in the blank justice." He
peers over the bench at Jill who is sitting smugly in her seat with a
smirk that betrays the trouble that she may be in. The judge hears
from all parties, admonishes Jill several times to stop laughing, and
Prior to writing this Comment, the Author co-wrote, with Richard A. GladAttorney-at-Law, the appellate brief for J.J.N. (known as "Jill" in this Comfor consideration by the Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth).
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 59.001-.015 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004).
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.007 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004); TEX. PEN. CODE
ANN. § 30.02(c) (Vernon 2002).
4. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.007.

1.
stone,
ment)
2.
3.
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finally decides her fate. She will be immediately taken into custody
and sent to the Texas Youth Commission (TYC) facility for an indeterminate period of time. She will be released when the TYC determines that she is ready for release, or her twenty-first birthday,
whichever comes first.5 Jill is led from the courtroom and summarily
shipped off to the TYC in-processing center en route to her ultimate
destination, a TYC confinement facility.
While Jack is a purely hypothetical character, the treatment he received is that which is suggested under the Code.6 The Code provides
Progressive Sanctions Guidelines (PSGs) that match a juvenile's crime
with a corresponding sanction level.7 Conversely, Jill's situation and
treatment is analogous to an actual case, involving a boy, that occurred in Texas in 2002.8 Today, the child in Jill's situation sits in the
TYC confinement facility for a first-offense conviction that will potentially leave him there until his twenty-first birthday, sometime in 2006.
How did Jill's judge get around the PSGs? The answer to that question is easy-by statute.9 Yes, after a full thirteen sections of the Code
announce the intricate system that should guide the disposition of
juveniles in Texas, section 59.014 operates to forbid a child from appealing his disposition on grounds that the judge did not follow the
sanctions guidelines.1" This provision accounts for the disparity between the dispositions received by Jack and Jill. 1
Jack's treatment is akin to that meted out in the federal criminal
system every day under the mandate of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (FSGs). 12 In the federal system, there is not a statutory, nonappealable "trap door" through which a judge can depart in his quest
to impose his own version of justice.1 3 Mandatory application of statutorily established juvenile progressive sanctioning guidelines in Texas
will, as they do in the federal sentencing regime, strike an equitable
5. See TEX. Hum. REs. CODE ANN. § 61.084(e) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004).
This provision requires the TYC to release anyone not falling within other sections of
the code requiring transfer to the Texas Department of Corrections to be released on
their twenty-first birthday. Thus, under a sentence for an indeterminate period of
time, the offender must be released by his or her twenty-first birthday. Id.
6. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.007 (establishing the range of punishment recommended for a second degree felony); TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 30.02(c) (establishing burglary as a second degree felony).
7. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.003 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004).
8. In re J.J.N., No. 2-02-204-CV, 2003 WL 253660 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Feb. 6,
2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication).
9. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.014 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004).
10. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.014(2)-(3).
11. See id.
12. See generally, Eric P. Berlin, Comment, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines'
Failure to Eliminate Sentencing Disparity: Governmental Manipulations Before Arrest,
1993 Wis. L. REV. 187, 193 (1.993) ("The Guidelines expressly prohibit the judge,
when choosing the appropriate sentencing range, from considering certain factors
about the individual offender.").
13. Id.
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balance between the crime committed and the sanction imposed.14
Thus, Texas should repeal Texas Family Code section 59.014 and allow
the juvenile progressive sanctioning guidelines to operate as written,
while allowing the safeguard of appellate review for deviation from
the guidelines. 5 In Part II of this Comment, the history and operation of the Texas Juvenile PSGs will be explored. Part III will include
an analysis of the FSGs to include a discussion of the strengths and
weaknesses. The analysis of the FSGs will be applied to the Texas
Juvenile System in Part IV. Finally, the argument will be made for the
mandatory application of the Texas Juvenile PSGs.

II.
A.

ANALYSIS OF RELEVANT TEXAS STATUTES

Texas Gets Tough on Crime-The Beginnings of the Texas
Juvenile Justice Code
1. How the PSGs Came into Being

The PSGs are largely a product of the new "get-tough" spirit that
swept the nation in the early to mid-1990s. 6 "In 1973, juvenile offenders were seen as less culpable than adults and deserved to be
given the chance to reform. Over the last twenty years, the rise in
serious juvenile crime has moved Texas lawmakers toward a more punitive punishment model."' 7 Texas was one of many states that was
growing concerned with the dramatic increase and severity of juvenile
offenses.' 8 As a result, there was a marked shift in the conventional
thinking concerning the way juvenile offenders were handled. 9 In the
past, juveniles were treated as children of the state.2 ° Consequently,
the state acted as a parent and sought to rehabilitate their wayward
charges.21 However, in line with the new problems of increased numbers and severity of juvenile offenses, the public began to clamor for a
more accountability-based approach in the treatment of juvenile offenders. 22 In response, states across the nation, including Texas, en14. See generally TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.001 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004)
(establishing the purposes of progressive sanctions guidelines); Douglas A. Berman,
Balanced and Purposeful Departures:Fixing a Jurisprudencethat Undermines the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 21, 30-31 (2000).

15. This action would also require amendment of Texas Family Code section 56.01,
the statute outlining a juvenile's permitted grounds for appeal, to add "deviation from
the Progressive Sanctions Guidelines" as a permitted ground for appeal. TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 56.01 (Vernon 2002).

16. See Justice Ed Kinkeade, Appellate Juvenile Justice in Texas-It's a Crime! Or
Should Be, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 17, 22-44 (1999).

17. Id. at 45.
18. See id. at 22.
19. See id. at 22-23.
20. Id. at 23.
21. Id.

22. Id. at 22-23.
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acted legislation seeking to satisfy the public's desire for a more
punishment-based approach. z3
In addition to public demand for a punishment-based juvenile justice system, problems within the Texas juvenile justice system of the
1960s and 1970s had grown to a critical point.2 4 In response to these
needs, the Texas Legislature enacted Title 3 of the Texas Family Code,
' 25
more commonly referred to as the "Texas Juvenile Justice Code.
In Texas, the PSGs were part of the legislation passed under thenGovernor George W. Bush in an effort to stem the tide of juvenile
offenses.2 6 The PSGs came into being under the 1995 amendments to
the Code designed to revise Title 3 of the Texas Family Code and were
promulgated by the legislature in the new "get-tough" spirit of juvenile punishment. 27 The PSGs were one part of a package of new provisions enacted in the Juvenile Justice Code.28 In addition to enacting
the PSGs, the Code addressed eight areas in an effort to move to a
more punitive model. 29 The changes enacted in the Juvenile Justice
Code "reflect the legislature's move from rehabilitation for serious juvenile offenders to making the punishment fit the crime. This trend is
analogous to the national trend to 'get tough' with juveniles."3 Thus,
the PSGs were enacted with the intent of focusing punishment on accountability in an effort to reverse the trend of rising juvenile offense
rates.3 1
B.

Discussion of the Purpose of PSGs

In addition to the fulfillment of a campaign promise to "get tough"
on crime made by George W. Bush when he was campaigning for the
Governorship of Texas,3 2 PSGs serve other, more utilitarian purposes. 33 First, "[t]he guidelines attempt to link the penalty to the of23.
24.
25.
26.

See id. at 22-23, 26-44.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 43-44.
Id. at 43.

27. Tex. H.B. 327, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995).
28. Id.

29. The eight areas are: goals and focus, accountability, progressive sanctions, violent/habitual offenders, determinate sentencing, files and records, job program, and
victim's rights. Kinkeade, supra note 16, at 43-44.
30. Id. at 45.
31. See id. at 43-45.
32. Id. at 43.
33. The purposes of the progressive sanctions model are to:
(1) ensure that juvenile offenders face uniform and consistent consequences
and punishments that correspond to the seriousness of each offender's current offense, prior delinquent history, special treatment or training needs,
and effectiveness of prior interventions;
(2) balance public protection and rehabilitation while holding juvenile offenders accountable;
(3) permit flexibility in the decisions made in relation to the juvenile offender to the extent allowed by law;
Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022
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fense, based on the severity of the crime." 34 Second, "[t]he purposes
of the guidelines are to ensure uniform punishment, while trying to
balance public safety and juvenile rehabilitation."3 5 Finally, the PSGs
were established to provide a range of punishment that allows the

court some degree of "flexibility in the decisions made in relation to

the juvenile offender to the extent allowed by law." 3 6 Thus, there
were four main ideas behind the legislature's establishment of the

PSGs: (1) make the punishment fit the crime; (2) rehabilitate the offender to the extent that it does not harm the public's safety; (3) ensure uniformity in punishment; and (4) permit flexibility.37
C. Discussion of the Operation of PSGs

The PSGs operate as a tiered system that matches the crime committed with the corresponding sanction level.38 Courts first look to
Texas Family Code section 59.003 to determine which sanction level
corresponds to the crime the juvenile has committed.39 This section of

the Code converts various types of crimes (that is, misdemeanors, misdemeanors committed with a firearm, first degree felonies, etc.) into
sanction level assignments.4 ° For example, the Code indicates that Jill
would be assigned to sanction level four because burglary is a second
degree felony in Texas.4 1
Once the court has determined which sanction level applies to the
crime committed by the juvenile, the court looks within the assigned
sanction level for the suggested range of punishment. 42 Briefly, the
levels are as follows.
1. Sanction Level One
Sanction Level One is the lowest level of punishment provided for
in the Code. 43 The sanctions in this level are usually applied to first(4) consider the juvenile offender's circumstances;
(5) recognize the departure of a disposition from this model is not necessarily undesirable and in some cases is highly desirable; and
(6) improve juvenile justice planning and resource allocation by ensuring
uniform and consistent reporting of disposition decisions at all levels.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.001 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004); see Kinkeade, supra
note 16, at 43-44.
34. Marcia Johnson, Texas Revised Juvenile Justice and Education Codes: Not All
Change is Good, 19 J. Juv. L. 1, 11 (1998).
35. Id.
36. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.001(3).
37. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.001; see Johnson, supra note 34, at 11.
38. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.003 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.003(a)(4); TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 30.02(c)
(Vernon 2002).
42. See Johnson, supra note 34, at 11-13.
43. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 59.004-.010 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004).
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time offenders and generally require the juvenile "to participate in
counseling or in a community-based citizen intervention program, or
she may be released into the custody of her parents."' 44 Offenses punished under this level are those that are not severe enough to be classified as Class A or B misdemeanors, but are still offenses that indicate
some need for supervision.4 5 An example of this type of offense is the
Class C misdemeanor offense of disorderly conduct.4 6
2.

Sanction Level Two

Juveniles sanctioned under this level are subject to various degrees
of probation, requirements to provide restitution for the victim,4 7 performance of "community service restitution,"4 8 participation in a
"community-based citizen intervention program, '49 and "[are] subject
to any appropriate conditions of probation." 0 One possible option of
probation includes attendance at a Youth Boot Camp.5 1 This program
emphasizes discipline through "physical and correctional training" in
a military-style environment.52 Offenders punished under this level
are those that are expelled from school for violation of a school policy
and those that commit Class A or B misdemeanor offenses. 53 Examples of Class A or B misdemeanors are assault and terroristic threat.54
3.

Sanction Level Three

Sanction Level Three largely focuses on the length of time and conditions of probation.
This level introduces the option of closely
monitoring the child's activities and behavior.5 6 Offenders punished
under this level are those that use a firearm in the commission of a
misdemeanor or those that commit a state jail felony or third degree
44. Johnson, supra note 34, at 11.
45. "[F]or conduct indicating a need for supervision, other than conduct described
in Section 51.03(b)(5) or a Class A or B misdemeanor, the sanction level is one."
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.003(a)(1) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004).

46.
47.

TEX. PEN. CODE ANN.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

48. Id.

49.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 42.01(d) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004).
§ 59.005(a)(2) (Vernon 2002).

§ 59.005(a)(6).

50. Johnson, supra note 34, at 11.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. "[F]or conduct indicating a need for supervision under Section 51.03(b)(5) or a
Class A or B misdemeanor, other than a misdemeanor involving the use or possession
of a firearm, or for delinquent conduct under Section 51.03(a)(2), the sanction level is
two." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.003(a)(2) (Vernon 2002); id. § 51.03(b)(5).

54.

TEX. PEN. CODE ANN.

§ 22.01(b) (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2004) (stating that

assault is classified as a Class A misdemeanor); TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 22.07(b)
(Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004) (stating that a terroristic threat is classified as a Class B
misdemeanor).
55. Johnson, supra note 34, at 12.

56.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 59.006(a)(4) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004).
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felony.57 Examples of offenses that could result in level three assignment are using a firearm in conjunction with a terroristic threat 58 or
impersonating a public servant.5 9

4.

Sanction Level Four

Sanction Level Four intensifies the conditions of probation. 61 This

level focuses on discipline and provides a highly structured program
that uses the tools of "discipline, physical fitness, social responsibility,

and productive work" to create a regimented environment for the
child.61 Offenders punished under this level are those who commit a
second degree felony.6 2 An example of second degree felony conduct
that would be punished under level four is the commission of a
robbery.6 3

5. Sanction Level Five
Sanction Level Five allows for the confinement of the child in a

"post-adjudication secure correctional facility" for a period of six to
twelve months. 6 Level five sanctions include the sanctions of the

lesser four levels.65 Offenders punished under level five are those
who commit less serious first degree felonies.66 An example of a first
degree felony punished under level five is a specific act of arson that
does not injure people but damages a "habitation or a place of assembly or worship."6 7

6.

Sanction Level Six

Sanction Level Six allows the child to be placed in the custody of
the TYC.6 8 Following release from the TYC facility, the court may
require that the child be enrolled in varying degrees of parole pro57. "[Flor a misdemeanor involving the use or possession of a firearm or for a
state jail felony or a felony of the third degree, the sanction level is three." TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 59.003(a)(3) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004).
58. See id.; TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 22.07(b) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004).
59. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.003(a)(3); TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 37.11(b)
(Vernon 2002).
60. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.007 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004).
61. "Children whose conduct subjects them to level-four sanctions may be required to participate in a highly intensive and regimented program where discipline,
physical fitness, social responsibility, and productive work are involved." Johnson,
supra note 34, at 12.
62. "[F]or a felony of the second degree, the sanction level is four." TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 59.003(a)(4).
63. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 29,02(b) (Vernon 2002).
64. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.008(a)(1) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004).
65. Johnson, supra note 34, at 12.
66. "[F]or a felony of the first degree, other than a felony involving the use of a
deadly weapon or causing serious bodily injury, the sanction level is five." TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 59.003(a)(5).
67. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 28.02(d)(2) (Vernon 2002).
68. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.009(a) (Vernon 2002).
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grams.69 "The [TYC] may discharge the child from the commission's
custody on the date the provisions of this section are met or on the
Offenders punished
child's 19th birthday, whichever is earlier."'
under this level are those who commit an "aggravated controlled substance felony," a capital felony, or a first degree felony with the aid of
a deadly weapon or "causing serious bodily injury."7 1 Examples of
conduct that would be punished under level six are murder 72 or some
more serious drug offenses.7 3

7.

Sanction Level Seven

Sanction Level Seven is the maximum sentencing tier available
under the Code. 74 This level allows the court to commit the child to
the TYC for a residential program lasting from one to ten years.7 5

Following release from the TYC facility, the court may assign probation along with any of the other measures from the previous sanction
levels.7 6 Offenders punished under level seven are those who commit

level six offenses but have a petition for transfer to the criminal court
pending.7 7 Additionally, those whose petitions have been approved

by the grand jury are punished under level seven.78 Examples of these
offenses are the same as those for level six but have the additional
factor of the pending transfer to criminal court or a grand jury approval of the petition.7 9

Additionally, in keeping with the express goal of allowing the court
some degree of flexibility in its decision-making, sanction levels two
through seven allow added flexibility for the court.8" The court may
"impose additional conditions on probation," 81 "additional sanc-

tions, "812 or "any other appropriate condition of supervision"8 3 that
69. Johnson, supra note 34, at 11; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.009(b).
70. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.009(c).
71. "[F]or a felony of the first degree involving the use of a deadly weapon or
causing serious bodily injury, for an aggravated controlled substances felony, or for a
capital felony, the sanction level is six." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.003(a)(6).
72. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.02(c) (Vernon 2003).
73. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.003(a)(6).
74. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 59.003-.010 (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2004).
75. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.010(a)(1) (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2004).
76. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.010(b).
77. [F]or a felony of the first degree involving the use of a deadly weapon or
causing serious bodily injury, for an aggravated controlled substance felony,
or for a capital felony, if the petition has been approved by a grand jury
under Section 53.045, or if a petition to transfer the child to criminal court
has been filed under Section 54.02, the sanction level is seven.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.003(a)(6)-(7).
78. Id. § 59.003(a)(7).
79. See id. § 59.003(a)(6)-(7).
80. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.005(a)(7) (Vernon 2002), § 59.006(a)(6)
(Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004).
81. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 59.005(a)(7), .006(a)(6).
82. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 59.007(a)(7), .008(a)(7) (Vernon 2002 & Supp.
2004).
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the court deems necessary. Thus, the legislature built in a flexibility
provision that allows juvenile courts to deviate from the established
guidelines.8 4
D.

The Problem-Texas Family Code Section 59.014: A Catalyst
for Divergent Treatment

There remains a separate provision following the PSGs in the Code
that allows for an unchecked avenue of deviation from the PSGs pro-

viding the juvenile no substantive recourse. 5 Section 59.014 provides
that a child cannot appeal a ruling by the court on the basis that the
court did not follow the PSGs, did not make a sanction level assign-

ment in accordance with the PSGs, and did not report deviations from
the PSGs.8 6
This single provision of the Code acts to negate any requirement on
the part of the juvenile court to follow the PSGs as laid out in the

previous thirteen subsections of the Code.8 7 In short, section 59.014,

while not expressly giving courts license to deviate wildly from the

PSGs without cause, certainly gives courts extreme flexibility without

the accountability that appellate review would provide.88
In light of section 59.014, appellate courts appear to either quickly
dismiss an appellant's point of error under the cloak of section 59.014

or use an analysis of the disposition based on the sufficiency of the

evidence to determine that the trial court has abused its discretion.89
In the case of In re C.C.,9° the court affirmed a disposition sending a

minor to the TYC for an indeterminate period of time for possessing
one to four grams of a controlled substance, an offense that called for
83. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.010(b)(3) (Vernon 2002); accord TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 59.009(b)(3) (Vernon 2002).
84. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.001(3) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004).
85. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.014 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004).
86. A child may not bring an appeal or postconviction writ of habeas corpus based

ANN.

on:
(1) the failure or inability of any person to provide a service listed under
Sections 59.004-59.010;
(2) the failure of a court or of any person to make a sanction level assignment as provided in Section 59.002 or 59.003;
(3) a departure from the sanction level assignment model provided by this
chapter; or
(4) the failure of a juvenile court or probation department to report a departure from the model.
Id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See In re C.C., 13 S.W.3d 854, 857-58 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet.) (illustrating the sweepingly broad discretion allowed to trial courts in the Texas juvenile
system.); In re A.S., 954 S.W.2d 855, 861-63 (Tex. App-El Paso 1997, no pet.) (demonstrating that the court is attempting to employ a "liberal" approach to the use of
the PSGs for the purpose of determining the equity of the trial court's sentence).
90. 13 S.W.3d 854 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet.).
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six to twelve months probation under the PSGs.9 1 In C.C., the court
first hung its hat on section 59.014 in denying a point of error that
alleged the disposition deviated from the PSGs and then affirmed the
disposition under the sufficiency of the evidence analysis. 92 In contrast, in In re A.S.,9 3 the court first recognized that deviation from the
PSGs was not a recognized ground for appeal but quickly determined
that the disposition sending the minor to the TYC was not supported
by the evidence. 94 In A.S., the court suggested a merger of the PSGs
deviation appeal and the sufficiency of the evidence analysis in stating
that the court "liberally construed the [PSGs deviation argument]
raised under this point of error as challenging the factual sufficiency of
the evidence to support the trial court's findings that permit A.S.'s
commitment to the T.Y.C ...... 9' The A.S. court used the sufficiency
of the evidence analysis to determine that the trial court's disposition
of the child to the TYC was not proper and constituted an abuse of
discretion. 96 Thus, there is authority in Texas that the PSGs' deviation
appeal has been "liberally construed" as a segue into an analysis of
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's disposition.9 7 It appears logical that mandatory application of the PSGs with
an accompanying right to appeal deviations from the standard would
lead courts into analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence that they
already undertake, but would provide a bright-line measuring stick in
the form of concrete standards against which to measure the trial
court's disposition.9 8 Therefore, the argument remains: Why not allow the PSGs to function as a mandatory guideline that forces trial
courts to provide just dispositions and allow for an appeal measured
by the standards set forth in the PSGs?
III.
A.

ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

The Beginnings of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (FSGs)
1. How FSGs Came into Being

Just as the "get-tough" on crime mentality was largely to credit for
the legislation that created the Texas juvenile PSGs, the same idea can
be credited with the creation of the FSGs.9 9 The enactment of the
sentencing guidelines in the federal system, like the Texas juvenile system, signaled that society had given up on rehabilitation as a goal of
the system and instead resorted to a system focused on "retribution
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 857.
Id. at 857-59.
954 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. App-El Paso 1997, no pet.).
Id. at 861-63.
Id. at 861.
Id. at 861-63.
See id. at 861.
See id.
See Berlin, supra note 12 at 187.
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and deterrence. ' ' °" In fact, in 1984, the Senate of the United States
determined that there was not a reliable way in which to cause or
measure the rehabilitation of a prisoner. 01 This determination was a
departure from nearly a half-century of following the theory of indeterminate sentencing, which focused on using the corrections system
to rehabilitate offenders.' 0 2 Additionally, for the better part of the
1900s, courts enjoyed a great deal of discretion when sentencing offenders.1" 3 Politicians were moved to act on the issue of crime as they
felt pressure from their constituents to move away from a soft approach to crime.' 04 Additionally, "desert-oriented" 10 5 changes enacted in the state criminal codes in the 1960s and the 1970s and Model
Penal Code reforms signaled a shift in criminal theory.1 0 6 The reforms
changed the traditional utilitarian model of punishment into a system
based on determinate sentencing10 7 and "truth in sentencing."'0 8 Indeed, as early as 1976, a report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task
Force on Criminal Sentencing found that "discretionary sentencing
schemes" created a great deal of sentencing disparity and that there
was a need for reforms that addressed both the justice and effectiveness of the sentences.1 0 9 The result of the new "get-tough" mentality
in the federal system was the enactment of the Sentencing Reform
Act as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.110 The
Act created the United States Sentencing Commission, which was "an
independent commission in the judicial branch" charged with the job
of creating guidelines for sentencing.11
2.

Discussion of the Purpose of FSGs

The calls for an independent commission to enact sentencing guidelines resulted from Congress's desire to accomplish four tasks: (1) pro100. Id. at 189; see Kinkeade, supra note 16, at 23.
101. Berlin, supra note 12, at 189-90.
102. Marguerite A. Driessen & W. Cole Durham, Jr., Sentencing Dissonancesin the
United States: The Shrinking Distance Between Punishment Proposed and Sanction
Served, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 623, 623 (2002) (supplemental volume). This Comment
focuses on the disparity in sentencing in the federal system and how the FSGs have
not corrected the sentencing disparity based on the mandatory application of narrow
sentence ranges without accounting for certain offender characteristics.
103. Berman, supra note 14, at 25.
104. Driessen & Durham, Jr., supra note 102, at 623-24.
105. Id. at 624-25.
106. See id.
107. Determinate sentencing is "[a] sentence for a fixed length of time rather than

for an unspecified duration."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

634 (2d pocket ed. 2001).

108. See Driessen & Durham, Jr., supra note 102, at 625.
109. "[D]iscretionary sentencing schemes created 'unexplained and seemingly inexplicable sentencing disparity' and [the Task Force] called for structural reforms in
sentencing to construct a 'system that is both more just to individual defendants in
terms of fairness and more effective in terms of reducing crime."' Berman, supra
note 14, at 27.
110. Berlin, supra note 12, at 191.
111. Id.
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vide courts with guidelines for sentencing; (2) move away from a
rehabilitative approach; (3) provide consistent sentences; and (4) ensure that sentence lengths for given offenses are not uncertain.' 12 In
short, Congress created the Sentencing Commission for the completion of three main goals: "honesty, uniformity and proportionality in
sentencing."' 1 3 In reducing the disparity in sentencing, Congress envisioned "a new system in which defendants with similar characteristics
who committed similar crimes received similar sentences."' 4 In November of 1987, the Sentencing Commission placed into effect the
sentencing guidelines they formulated under this charge from
Congress.115
3.

Discussion of the Operation of FSGs

The FSGs represent a compromise between a "charge offense" system and a "real offense" system. 116 A "real offense" system considers
the circumstances surrounding the case in determining an appropriate
punishment." 7 A "charge offense" system is a more uniformly applied system, as all crimes of a certain type are punished in a similar
manner." 8 The Sentencing Commission's work resulted in a set of
FSGs that are "closer to a charge offense system with a number of real
offense elements."' 19 Thus, the FSGs create a framework that is influenced by the circumstances of the criminal event but seeks to sentence
20
criminals within similar classifications in a more uniform manner.
The essential tool required to employ the FSGs is the Guidelines
Manual.' 2 1 "The [FSGs] are, in a sense, simply a long set of instructions for one chart-the Sentencing Table.' 2 2 The guideline is composed of "eight chapters, each with a particular focus."' 23 The
112. "[Congress sought] to eliminate the lack of sentencing guidance to the judiciary, the imprisonment for the purpose of coercive rehabilitation, the disparity in sentencing, and the uncertainty about the amount of time an offender would actually
serve on a prison sentence ...." Id.
113. Id. at 192; accord THOMAS W. HUTCHISON ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING LAw
AND PRACTICE (2004) (containing the complete FSG along with commentary to guide
the reader through the employment of the FSGs).
114. William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 495, 495 (1990).
115. Id. at 496.
116. Berlin, supra note 12, at 194.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 193-94.
120. See id.
121. See THOMAS W. HUTCHISON ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE, at III (2004) (noting that "[e]very participant in the federal criminal justice system must be knowledgeable about the guidelines . . .because the guidelines affect
every stage of the process, including plea negotiations, trial strategy, sentencing, and
appeals").
122. Frank 0. Bowman, III, Fear of Law: Thoughts on Fear of Judging and the State
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 299, 305 (2000).
123. Driessen & Durham, Jr., supra note 102, at 631.
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chapters relevant to this Comment are as follows. Chapter one provides the reader with some introductory material, including instructions on the use of the manual, relevant definitions, and principles of
guideline application.1 24 Chapter two explains the offense guidelines
that govern each category of offense.' 2 5 Under each offense guideline, there is a base level offense and appropriate specific offense
characteristics that are used to "add (and sometimes subtract) levels
to the base offense level.' 1 26 Chapter three allows for general adjustments of the base level by adding or subtracting from the base level
offense determined in Chapter two. 12 7 Chapter four deals with the
determination of the "offender's criminal history category.' 1 28 Chapter five instructs the user on the determination of the "sentence, including probation,
prison, conditional release, fines, and
29
restitution."1
In applying the FSGs, the judge engages in a fairly mechanical pro1 30
cess that renders a sentence on the far end of the judge's analysis.
The judge first determines the base offense level from Chapter Two of
the Guidelines Manual. 1 31 Then, the base offense level is adjusted
under the applicable "offense or offender characteristics" listed in
Chapter Three.132 Next, the judge turns to Chapter Four and determines the offender's criminal history score and places the offender in
one of six criminal history categories. 3 3 Finally, the judge turns to the
sentencing table in Chapter Five and determines the sentence range
by finding the intersection of the criminal history category (horizontal
axis) and resulting offense level (vertical axis) on the table.1 34 This
process yields a sentencing that is narrow in range and, by statute,
cannot exceed six months or twenty-five percent in range from minimum to maximum sentence in that specific sentencing range. 135 Overall, the FSGs "invoke a harm-based penology, which concentrates
more on the nature and extent of the injury or harm resulting from the
defendant's acts than on the nature of the offense or on the defendant's character and mental processes. "136
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 632.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. For example, if the total possible range of sentencing for a particular offense is ten years, a specific range within the total possible range cannot exceed two
and one-half years.
136. Berlin, supra note 12, at 195.
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B.

FSGs' Strengths & Weaknesses

1. Not a Perfect System-FSGs' Weaknesses
Critics of the FSGs believe that the guidelines create an unfair system that does not do what it was intended to do. 1 3 7 The main thrust of
the sub-components of the body of criticism essentially boils down to
the idea that lack of emphasis on offender culpability creates an unfair
system. 1 38 Critics feel that the system is unfair because, based on the
lack of offender culpability analysis, it dispenses sentences that are
anything but uniform. 139 When viewed from the critics' "culpabilitybased" penology, the cases within sentencing ranges are not necessarily alike, thus contributing to the problem of sentencing disparity."'
More simply put, the fact that offenders of a similar crime are lumped
into narrow sentencing ranges, while dishing out relatively similar
sentences, fails to adequately take into account important differences
in the offenders that are based on critical offender characteristics not
addressed by the FSGs."'
There are three main categories of criticism concerning the operation of the FSGs."' 2 First, the FSGs are said to "unwisely intrude
upon and unduly restrict the sentencing court's discretion."'1 3 One
component of the "loss of discretion" criticism is the idea that the
process engaged in through the FSGs is too mechanical and does not
adequately consider the culpability of the offender."' Instead, say
critics, the process focuses on the harm created by the crime, which is
"an insufficient measure of the punishment deserved."' 45 The FSGs
represent a significant break from the traditional model of sentencing,
characterized by "unfettered discretion in sentencing" that took into
account the totality of the offender's characteristics, which lend themselves to the culpability of the offender."' 6 Thus, following this line of
criticism, the FSGs are an unwise solution to the problems of sentencing because they employ "deliberately impersonal sentencing rules,"
which are inappropriate given the need for judges to assess not only
the harm created by the offender's conduct but also the culpability of
the offender. 14 7 Critics argue that the old system's characteristically
wide span of "judge's discretion" made a better vehicle for measuring
an equitable level of punishment for each offender, in light of the spe137. See id. at 199-200.
138. See id.; Driessen & Durham, Jr., supra note 102, at 633-34.
139. See Berlin, supra note 12, at 199-200.
140. See id.
141. See id. ("By treating unlike cases alike, the Guidelines violate rather than promote equality and fairness.").
142. Driessen & Durham, Jr., supra note 102, at 633.
143. Id.
144. See Berlin, supra note 12, at 196-97.
145. Id. at 197.
146. Id.; Driessen & Durham, Jr., supra note 102, at 633.
147. Driessen & Durham, Jr., supra note 102, at 633; Berlin, supra note 12, at 197.
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cific characteristics of culpability that each offender brings before the
bench. 148
The second major criticism of the FSGs is that the "structure and
content" of the FSGs do not reflect good policy choices on the part of
the Sentencing Commission, the promulgator of the FSGs. 149 These
criticisms address both action taken on the part of the Sentencing
Commission and the absence of action in other areas.15° Generally,
this class of commentary addresses specific criticisms regarding the
form and substance the FSGs have taken under the stewardship of the
Sentencing Commission. 1 5 ' In short, there is a major body of general
criticism that posits that the Sentencing Commission has gone about
its reforms in the wrong manner
and has not crafted a functional sys1 52
tem for establishing justice.
Finally, critics posit the notion that FSGs are ineffective in their
operation because they address only "one potential source of the unwarranted disparity they were designed to address."' 53 Basically, this
argument revolves around the idea that while the FSGs instruct the
court in how to mete out punishment, the FSGs do not take into account other factors that affect the end result of the sentencing process:
namely police and prosecutor actions and discretion.15 The actions of
the police in investigating and prosecutors in choosing how to charge
the offense, say the critics, "form the starting
point in the court's de1 55
termination of the ultimate sentence."'
2. A Departure from the Status Quo-FSGs' Strengths
When considering the utility of the FSGs, there is a great deal of
opinion regarding whether or not the guidelines have achieved their
purpose or, as some critics argue, have made sentencing problems
worse.1 56 As one scholar has noted: "Few of those who believe that
the evolving Guidelines system represents a significant advance in
sentencing practice and is workable in the day-to-day administration
of justice have put pen to paper.' 1 57 However, a number of scholars
note strengths within the FSG system. Next, some of the strengths of
the FSGs' regime will be considered.
148. Berlin, supra note 12, at 197; Driessen & Durham, Jr., supra note 102, at 633.
149. Driessen & Durham, Jr., supra note 102, at 633.
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 633-34.
155. See id.
156. See Julie R. O'Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines' Modified
Real-Offense System, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1342, 1343-44 (1997); Driessen & Durham,
Jr., supra note 102, at 633.
157. O'Sullivan, supra note 156, at 1344 (referring to the idea that there is a limited
amount of scholarship devoted to the pronouncement of positive aspects and effects
of the FSGs).
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First, advocates for the FSGs argue that the guidelines relieve the
system of the degree of judicial discretion that, in the past, led to the
158
widespread sentencing disparity that riddled the pre-FSGs system.
There are two main thrusts of argument on this point. 159 First, the
FSGs advocates argue that judges have maintained a respectable degree of discretion under the FSGs because they are allowed to depart
from the guidelines if "there exists some circumstance, aggravating or
mitigating, to a degree not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines.' 60 However,
it must be noted that deviation from the FSGs is tightly restrained and
judges must refer to various approved factors for consideration listed
in the guidelines. 161 This creates a somewhat difficult standard as it
prevents the use of "factors such as age, employment record, or family
ties that judges formerly used to 'individualize' sentences.' 1 62 Next,
advocates argue that the limitation of the traditional "unbridled sentencing discretion that judges enjoyed" prior to the enactment of the
FSGs acts as a much-needed check on the ever-growing realm of
prosecutorial discretion. 163 In addition to establishing sentencing
ranges, the FSGs also establish standards for charging offenders and
negotiating plea agreements 64 Under this line of thinking, the
strength of the FSGs is its ability to temper the discretion enjoyed by
prosecutors under the modern criminal Code.1 65
166
Second, the FSGs provide a fairly straightforward standard.
However, many critics of the FSGs argue that the guidelines are too
complex and unwieldy for the average practitioner to proficiently
manage.' 67 Advocates for the FSGs, however, disagree with this
statement and offer empirical evidence that the system is actually
quite simple to maneuver through. 168 As explained above, the FSGs
essentially take two characteristics into account in determining the
sentence: offense severity and offender characteristics.169 The complicated part of the process, critics argue, is in the application of the myr70
iad number of adjustments available in the guidelines manual.'
158. Thomas N. Whiteside, The Reality of Federal Sentencing: Beyond the Criticism,
91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1574, 1590-92 (1997). Whiteside advocates for the FSGs in a piece
that discusses and dismisses many of the criticisms of the FSGs. While an advocate
for the FSG scheme, Whiteside states that there is still room for a great deal of improvement and refers to the current system of FSGs as a "foundation." Id. at 1598.
159. See id.
160. Id. at 1590.
161. Bowman, III, supra note 122, at 308.
162. Id.
163. Whiteside, supra note 158, at 1591.
164. Id. at 1591-93.
165. See id.
166. Id. at 1585.
167. Id.
168. See id. at 1587.
169. Driessen & Durham, Jr., supra note 102, at 631.
170. See Whiteside, supra note 158, at 1586-87.
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However, statistics show that "most offenders require only the simplest of adjustments and have little or no prior criminal record."''
Thus, advocates appreciate the mechanical application of justice to offenders as a simple solution to a complex set of variables.' 72
Finally, advocates of the FSGs argue that the FSGs strike an equitable balance between the rigidity of a "charge-based" system and the
subjectivity and non-uniformity of punishment in the "real-offense"
system. 173 In other words, the modern FSGs factor in enough offender characteristics to prevent being overly insensitive to the characteristics of the offender, without focusing on offender characteristics
to the extent that the subjective discretion of the judge is allowed to
create a wide body of disparate sentences that do not, on the whole,
paint a uniform picture of sentencing. 174 Thus, the strength of the
modern FSGs is their effectiveness in decreasing the range of
sentences for a given offense while, at the same time, considering various offender characteristics that warrant a stiffer
or more relaxed sen1 75
tence within the guideline-mandated range.
IV.

APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL ANALYSIS TO THE TEXAS
JUVENILE SYSTEM

In light of the above discussion, this Comment will next explore a
vision of how the Texas juvenile PSGs could fare if sections 59.002
thru 59.013 were made mandatory and were allowed to operate without the disclaimer found in section 59.014.
A.

Applying the Strengths

As stated above, advocates for the operation of the FSGs argue that
some key strengths of the FSGs system are that the guidelines allow
for an appropriate amount of judicial discretion, that they are a
straightforward standard with few areas of complexity, and that they
strike a good balance between the seriousness of the offense and the
characteristics of the offender.' 7 6

If allowed to operate as a

mandatory sanction guideline, the PSGs would demonstrate these
same strengths.1 77 Consider the following arguments under the assumption that section 59.014 of the Texas Family Code was not in operation and the PSGs were mandatory.
171. Id. at 1587.
172. See id. at 1585-90.
173. See O'Sullivan, supra note 156, at 1352-61.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See Whiteside, supra note 158, at 1585; O'Sullivan, supra note 156, at 1352-61.
177. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.003 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004); Driessen &
Durham, Jr., supra note 102, at 632; Whiteside, supra note 158, at 1585.
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1. Judicial Discretion
The first point of discussion is the issue of judicial discretion. Currently in Texas, "[a] juvenile court has broad discretion in determining
a suitable disposition for a juvenile who has been adjudged to have
engaged in delinquent conduct."17' 8 The PSGs, like the FSGs, lay out

a series of "sentencing ranges" within which a judge may choose an

appropriate disposition. 179 Because the PSGs include options of various degrees of probation, confinement, mandatory counseling and

treatment, and community restitution, 8 ° they establish a much
broader range within each sanction level than that found within the
FSGs. The sentencing ranges found in the FSGs are comparatively
narrow, allowing for only a narrow range of confinement measured in
months. 181 Thus, the PSGs offer even more judicial discretion than
that found in the FSGs.
2.

Simplicity

The second point of discussion is the issue of simplicity of the PSG
standards. The PSGs are codified in thirteen sections of the Code,

occupying three to four pages of text, depending on the version of the
Code that is in use.' 8 2 The FSGs, as codified in the 2002 edition of the
FederalSentencing Law and Practice,occupies 1,669 pages broken into
eight chapters. 1 83 While the FSGs are arguably simple in application

inthe average case,'84 they are certainly a lengthier, more intricate

system than that laid out in the PSGs.18 5 Additionally, the PSGs are

simpler in their operation concerning the consideration of offender
characteristics. 8 6 Offender characteristics in the PSGs are considered
within section 59.003 and are largely limited to previous delinquent
1 87
history and circumstances of the act, such as the use of a firearm.
Alternatively, the FSGs allow adjustments to the "base offense" by
considering such factors as "role in the offense, the amount of drugs
178. In re J.D.P., 85 S.W.3d 420, 426 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (demonstrating a solid statement by the court that the discretion of the trial court is very
broad in determining dispositions for juvenile offenders).
179. Driessen & Durham, Jr., supra note 102, at 632.
180. See Johnson, supra note 34, at 11-13.
181. See Driessen & Durham, Jr., supra note 102, at 632.
182. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 59.001-.013 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004).
183. See HUTCHISON ET AL., supra note 113.
184. Whiteside, supra note 158, at 1585.
185. See generally TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 59.001-.013 (the PSGs); HUcHISoN
ET AL., supra note 113.
186. Compare TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.003 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004) (assigning a specific sanction level for a list of specified offenses), with Driessen & Durham, Jr., supra note 102, at 631-32 (noting that, depending on the offense
characteristic, offense levels might be added or subtracted from the base offense in a
myriad of chapters of the guidelines).
187. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.003.
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'
or fraud ...[and] criminal history."188
Thus, the PSGs offer an even

simpler method of1 89
determining an offender's disposition than that
found in the FSGs.
3.

Seriousness of Offense and Offender Characteristics

The final point of discussion is the issue of balancing the seriousness
of the offense with the characteristics of the offender. Both the PSGs
and the FSGs address these factors when determining the statutory
punishment.1 90 Both the PSGs and FSGs begin the punishment deter-

mination process with the designation of a "base offense."' 191 The
192
"base offense" represents the actual crime that was committed.
Subsequent to the determination of the "base offense," both the PSGs

and FSGs enter into an adjustment phase that takes offender characteristics into account. 1 93 As stated above, the PSGs offer a simpler
alternative to the consideration of these factors. 94 The PSGs integrate certain offender characteristics for consideration into section
59.003, which assigns the sanction level for each degree of crime while
taking the offender characteristics into consideration. 1 95 Section
59.003 lists the sanction level for various degrees of crime, including
misdemeanors, first degree felonies, and so on. 19 6 Further, section
59.003 takes into account such factors as whether or not a firearm was
involved in the crime and whether the juvenile is a recidivist when
assigning the appropriate sanction level. 197 These factors are used by
the statute to mandate a higher or lower sanction level.' 9 8 This regime
is similar to that found in the FSGs and, arguably, provides a similar
balance between the seriousness of the offense and the characteristics
of the offender. 199
188. Hon. Paul D. Borman, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 16 T.M. COOLEY L.
REV.

1, 6 (1999).

189. Compare TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.003 (assigning a specific sanction level
for a list of specific offenses), with Driessen & Durham, Jr., supra note 102, at 631-32
(noting that, depending on the offense characteristic, offense levels might be added or
subtracted from the base offense in a myriad of chapters of the guidelines).
190. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.003; Driessen & Durham, Jr., supra note 102,
at 632.
191. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.003(a); Driessen & Durham, Jr., supra note
102, at 631-32.
192. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.003(a).
193. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.003(b)-(e); Driessen & Durham, Jr., supra
note 102, at 631-32.
194. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.003; Driessen & Durham, Jr., supra note 102,
at 632 (noting that the "federal sentencing structure is ostensibly a fairly mechanical,
if not fairly complex undertaking").

195. See
196.
197.
198.
199.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 59.003.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.; O'Sullivan, supra note 156, at 1352-61.
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Having considered the application of the strengths of the
mandatory operation of the PSGs in light of the strengths of the somewhat similar existing sentencing system of the FSGs, this Comment
will now address the weaknesses of the proposed mandatory operation of the PSGs in the Texas juvenile system.
B.

Mitigating the Weaknesses

As stated above, there are three general categories of criticisms of
the FSGs that could potentially echo through the Texas juvenile system if the PSGs were legislated into mandatory operation: 1) overintrusiveness on judicial discretion; 2) bad policy and inaction on the
part of the promulgator of the guidelines; and 3) lack of focus on
other elements of the charging or sentencing regime (i.e.,
prosecutorial discretion).2 °°
1. Over-Intrusiveness on Judicial Discretion
The first issue of discussion is the intrusion of the guidelines on traditionally broad judicial discretion. This issue takes into account both
the history of broad judicial discretion that has been the legacy of
judges in this country, and the need for judges to have some freedom
to maneuver outside the guidelines for the sake of those offenders
that are treated unfairly under the statutory guidelines. 20 1 The PSGs
offer the judge broad discretion in the language of sanction levels two
through seven, allowing the court to impose additional "conditions on
probation, 20 2 "additional sanctions, 20 3 or "any other appropriate
condition of supervision '' 2 that the court deems necessary. These
sections of the PSGs offer the judge an opportunity for broad discretion within the guidelines that cannot be said to be intrusive. 20 5 Thus,
the weakness detected in the FSGs concerning the intrusion into the
area of judicial discretion is not valid with respect to the PSGs, given
the mechanisms for the exercise of judicial discretion found within the
guidelines.2 0 6
2. Policy
The second issue of discussion is policy. The PSGs, like the FSGs,
are vulnerable to a criticism that the rule-making body is not acting on
200. See Driessen & Durham, Jr., supra note 102, at 633-34.
201. See id.
202. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.005(a)(7) (Vernon 2002), § 59.006(a)(6) (Vernon
2002 & Supp. 2004).
203. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 59.007(a)(7), .008(a)(7) (Vernon 2002 & Supp.
2004).
204. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.010(b)(3) (Vernon 2002); accord TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 59.009(b)(3) (Vernon 2002).
205. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 59.005(a)(7), .006(a)(6), .007(a)(7), .008(a)(7),
.009(b)(3), .010(b)(3).
206. See id.
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good policy2" 7 and is not responsive to changes that need to be enacted.2 °8 Where the PSGs vary from the FSGs, however, is the fact
that the PSGs were promulgated by the Texas Legislature,2 °9 whereas
the FSGs were created by an independent commission operating
under a charter from Congress.21 0 Because the PSGs were promulgated by a political entity that bears direct accountability to the people of Texas, the legislature arguably has more of a vested interest in
acting on sound policy decisions and responding to criticisms than
does an independent commission.2 11 Thus, because the promulgators
of the Texas PSGs are elected legislators who can be voted out of
office by their critics, the criticisms against the FSGs based upon policy choices and organizational responsiveness arguably are mitigated
in the Texas PSGs by the direct link between the electorate, the legislators, and the PSGs.2 12
3.

Scope

The final issue for discussion is the scope of the regulations. Critics
of the FSGs argue that the FSGs fail to limit sentencing disparity because they do not address other elements within the system (i.e., investigators and prosecutors)2 3 The PSGs are also vulnerable to such
criticism. 214 However, the Texas juvenile judge's broad range of discretion to mete out varying combinations of punishment and treatment2 15 acts as a check on the power of the investigator and
prosecutor. In short, the PSGs' broad range of options available in
each category allows the judge to compensate for an "over-charged"
offender, with latitude to deviate from the guidelines altogether.2 1 6
The FSGs also contain a provision for deviation from the guidelines,21 7 but because the sentencing range within each tier of the
guideline is so narrow,2 18 in a situation where the prosecutor has overcharged an offender, the federal judge has few options other than
deviation from the guidelines.2 1 9 Thus, the PSGs are better equipped
to deal with an over-zealous investigator or prosecutor.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

See Driessen & Durham, Jr., supra note 102, at 633.
See id. at 633-34.
Kinkeade, supra note 16, at 43-44.
Berlin, supra note 12, at 191.
See Kinkeade, supra note 16, at 43, 45.
See id.
Driessen & Durham, Jr., supra note 102, at 633-34.

214. See TEx.

FAM. CODE ANN.

§§ 59.001-.015 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004).

215. See Johnson, supra note 34, at 11-13 (explaining the PSGs punishment sanction levels).
216. See id.
217. Whiteside, supra note 158.
218. See Driessen & Durham, Jr., supra note 102, at 632.
219. See id. at 627-32.
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V.

CONCLUSION / PROPOSED ACTION

The repeal of Texas Family Code section 59.014 would allow the
PSGs to operate as intended, provide an adequate level of judicial
discretion, and give a child like Jill 22 0 an avenue for appeal when the
system does not offer a proportionate disposition as measured by the
PSGs. The Texas legislature clearly laid out its purposes for the PSGs
in section 59.001.221 The inclusion of section 59.014, while not giving a
court a blank check and denying children all grounds for appeal, certainly gives the court free latitude to dispose of juvenile cases in manners that may bear no resemblance to the purposes called for by the
legislature in the PSGs. Thus, in keeping with the purposes laid out in
section 59.001, it is logical that the standard enumerated in sections
59.002-59.013 be allowed to operate as written. To do otherwise appears to controvert the intent behind the PSGs and leaves children
disproportionately sentenced outside of the guidelines of the PSGs
without recourse on this ground.2 2 2
The PSGs are a set of guidelines surprisingly intricate for their compact size. In reading the PSGs, one gains a sense that they were designed with their purposes in mind and inoculated with various safety
mechanisms to prevent abuse.2 23 The guidelines match offenses with
sanction levels and allow for some adjustment.2 2 4 Further, the inclusion of provisions that allow a judge to add "appropriate" measures in
most sanction levels invites judges to exercise some reasonable degree
of discretion.22 5
Finally, in considering Jill's case, it only seems logical that she be
allowed to appeal on a point of error that specifies that the court punished her in accordance with a sanction level that appears several
levels above that which was called for in the guidelines. What clearer
measuring stick that a disposition was "against the great weight of the
evidence" than that which is used to match offenses with dispositions
while considering certain characteristics of the offender? If the Texas
juvenile courts are not held to some semblance of standard concerning
juvenile disposition, citizens of Texas run the inevitable risk that the
TYC will continue to be filled with children such as Jill, while others
are allowed to roam the streets. This outcome is not what the Texas
226
Legislature hoped for when codifying the purposes for the PSGs.
Additionally, it is not the outcome that provides the fairness that all
citizens of Texas, children included, deserve. Jill will continue to serve
her indeterminate sentence with the TYC. Her disposition was ulti220. See infra Part I.
221. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.001 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004).
222. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 59.001-.015 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004).

223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.001.
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mately affirmed on appeal with the ringing phrase, "[a] juvenile
court's decision is guided by the [PSGs], but the guidelines are not
mandatory. '22 7 If section 59.014 is allowed to continue to operate as a
goaltender for the appellate courts for those judges that do not comply with the PSGs, the phrase "tough on crime" might well be
amended to add the postscript "...
soft on justice."
Clifford MacKenzie
227. In re J.J.N., No. 2-02-204-CV, 2003 WL 253660, at *4 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
Feb. 6, 2003, no pet.) (mrnem. op.) (not designated for publication).
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